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The Affordable Care Act and Tax Policy
STEPHEN UTZ
The Affordable Care Act fails to coordinate the impact of tax burdens
on individuals with the global aim of extending the availability of health
care insurance. The price of private health insurance depends in this
country on who buys it; large employers pay less than small employees and
individuals for the same level of coverage. Because the ACA does not
eliminate these and related artefactual cost differences, the Act's price-
based adjustments of the post-tax cost of health care to individuals simply
perpetuate or worsen central problems of tax fairness and neutrality.
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The Affordable Care Act and Tax Policy
STEPHEN UTZ*
I. INTRODUCTION
If a rational health care policy on its own is not easy to construct, the
difficulty is compounded when tax policy must be factored into the
equation. This country, of course, takes a mixed public/private approach to
health care,' a wistful form of pragmatism that reflects the absence of
consensus over what our national health care policy should be.2 As things
stood, health care insurance and self-insurance regularly interacted with the
taxation of individuals' purchased and un-purchased health gains.3 The
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 ("ACA")4 promises to
make our mixed approach more systematic, by intervening in these private
health care markets that are already significantly tax-driven. The ACA , as
part of its attempt to organize and rationalize health care policy,5 must
accordingly confront the interaction of health care policy and tax policy.
Making sense of the intersection of these two policy areas is only one
of the ACA's many goals, and, although well intentioned, the Act does a
" Professor of Law, University of Connecticut Law School; JD University of Texas School of
Law; Ph.D. University of Cambridge; BA Louisiana State University.1 See Lance Gable, The Patient Protection andAffordable Car Act, Public Health, and the Elusive
Target of Human Rights, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 340, 342 (2011) ("[T]he inherent complexity of the
United States health care system, with its public private structure and multiple participants, demands
detailed, voluminous legislation....").
2 See Robert J. Blendon & John M. Benson, Americans' Views on Health Policy: A Fifty-Year
Historical Perspective, 20 HEALTH AFF. 33, 36 (2001) ("Among the confounding factors is the lack of
an underlying consensus among the American public over the preferred type of national health plan.").
3 See Robert B. Helms, Tax Policy and the History of the Health Insurance Industry 17-18 (Am.
Enterprise Inst., Feb. 29, 2008), available at http://www.aei.org/papers/health/healthcare-
reform/private-insurance/tax-policy-and-the-history-of-the-heath-insurance-industry/ (describing the
relationship between tax policy and health care insurance, focusing particularly on how tax policy
increases the demand for group health insurance).
4 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified
in scattered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29, 30, and 42 U.S.C.), amended by Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified in scattered sections of 20,
26, and 42 U.S.C.).
5 See KAREN DAVIS ET AL., STARTING ON THE PATH TO A HIGH PERFORMANCE HEALTH SYSTEM:
ANALYSIS OF THE PAYMENT AND SYSTEM REFORM PROVISIONS IN THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT OF 2010 xiv-xv (2010), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/
-/media/Files/Publications/Fund%20Report/2010/Sep/1442 Davis Payment'/o20and%20System%20R
eform_923v2.pdf (stating that the measures incorporated in the ACA would "stimulate significant
changes in the organization and delivery of health services and create powerful incentives to improve
efficiency and productivity").
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poor job in this regard. It fails altogether to take a new look at the problem
of evaluating and coordinating the impact of tax burdens and government
health initiatives on the well-being of the public, relying instead on
inadequate proxies for these purposes.6 Because the Act tries to work
through the private sector to provide a public good, it runs directly into the
perennial problems of markets' mis-measurement of utility, non-
measurement of opportunity, and utter insensitivity to the mesh of utility
and opportunity, which, collectively, are the most plausible measure of
well-being.7  At bottom, what haunts the blind use of economic
benchmarks is the old dilemma about whether opportunity or outcomes, or
some combination of the two, provide the ultimate criterion of well-being.
By failing to approach the problem seriously, the Act fails to integrate tax
policy with this major intervention in health care and creates a new range
of inequities. The difficult politics of the legislative process obviously
persuaded its proponents to accept rough-and-ready solutions8 that will
often have tragic consequences. Desperate advocacy of the primary and
admirable goals of the law seemed to excuse the lack of concern for an
integrated theoretical solution. Theory, after all, often seems to have
nothing to do with the goal of relieving human suffering. But in this
instance, theory could have guided the proponents of the ACA to a better,
and politically feasible, solution.
The essence of the Act's failure in this regard is that it does not even
try to adjust economic consequences to those covered by the new system
so that combined out-of-pocket and tax burdens are equal for all. This
would of course be easily achieved by a single-payor system, because the
benefits would flow to beneficiaries without money changing hands, or
with income-adjusted co-pay. The ACA does little to accomplish an
equivalent result. Its tax provisions are collectively inequitable and thus
out of accord with one of the primary goals of income taxation.
II. THE PROBLEM
What does tax law have to do with health care? Many federal and
local taxes have only a small effect on health care markets and outcomes. 9
6 See infra Part 111.
'See infra Part Ill.
8 See Janet L. Dolgin & Katherine R. Dieterich, Social and Legal Debate About the Affordable
Care Act, 80 UMKC L. REV. 45, 50-51 (2011) (describing the political circumstances of the ACA's
passage).
9 There are currently no excise taxes on the ingredients of health care delivery. See JANE G.
GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40648, TAX OPTIONS FOR FINANCING HEALTH CARE REFORM,
(2010) (listing prospective excises taxes and implicitly noting that no current excise taxes affect health
care delivery). The background economic consequences of the income, gift, and estate taxes are so
diffuse that they do not affect the economy as a whole measurably. See JOEL SLEMROD & JOHN
BAKUA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE OVER TAXES 99-157 (4th ed. 2008).
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Income taxation is another matter. A tax on income can be an unfair
burden on people who must pay for their own, differing health care needs.
An income tax that ignores these inherent differences in the cost of health
care for each individual will mis-measure income itself and, in a world of
high private health care costs, grossly fail to achieve the two main goals of
broad direct taxation: fairness and economic neutrality.
To understand why, we must first consider certain broad features of
income taxation. A tax on income must distinguish taxpayers' outlays that
contribute to the production of income from other outlays.10 Income-
seeking outlays are subtracted from gross revenue in measuring income
because income is the flow of new wealth, and costs are, by definition,
paid out of old wealth already on hand. This netting of gross income and
costs is, however, only one rationale for allowing deductions as part of the
computation of taxable income. The deduction of losses, or the exclusion
of recoveries for losses, has a different rationale. Unforeseeable and
unusual losses that are beyond an individual's control cannot be described
as uses of income at all. Gross income that disappears without the owner's
involvement is properly subtracted from income, not as a cost of producing
it, but as never properly belonging to the flow of new wealth."'
Income tax systems always allow extraordinary losses to be deducted
(sometimes with restrictions that reflect evidentiary or administrative
issues).1 2 Arguably, expenses related to health and dying deserve the same
treatment, and they should either be deductible or excluded from gross
income. There is, however, another argument for adjusting income
measurement downward to reflect them. William D. Andrews, and
subsequent commentators, have maintained that income spent on health
care should not be taxed because these expenses restore the individual's
Disparity in the income taxation of charitable and for-profit hospitals probably has some effect on
health care delivery, but apparently for-profits are increasing in number despite the advantages enjoyed
by charitable hospitals. See generally William M. Gentry & John R. Penrod, The Tax Benefits of Not-
for-Profit Hospitals, in THE CHANGING HOSPITAL INDUSTRY: COMPARING FOR-PROFIT AND NoT-FOR-
PROFIT INSTITUTIONS 285, 285-324 (David M. Cutler ed., 2000). Currently, only the individual
income tax has a major effect on health care, by excluding the value of employer-provided health
insurance from the gross income of employees and permitting a comparable exclusion to employees
who must buy their own, only through the less generous mechanism of health-savings accounts and
flexible spending plans. See infra notes 104-108 and accompanying text.
1o See STEPHEN UTZ, TAX POLICY: AN INTRODUCTION AND SURVEY OF THE PRINCIPAL DEBATES
90-91 (1993)("[T]he point is to contrast previously available economic resources with newly created
ones ... ").
1 HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938) ("In other words, [income] is
merely the result obtained by addition consumption during the period to 'wealth' at the end of the
period and then subtracting 'wealth' at the beginning. The sine qua non of income is gain, as our
courts have recognized in their more lucid moments-and gain to someone during a specified time
interval.").
12 See I.R.C. § 165 (2006) (allowing for deduction of certain unforeseeable losses from gross
income, including certain losses in insolvent financial institutions and disaster losses).
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basic human endowment, the starting point from which income should be
measured.13 Evidently, this rationale for the deduction of health costs
differs from the rationale for deducting losses. Losses must be deducted to
prevent the double counting of income-the inclusion of already acquired
income along with new income that flowed from the investment of the old
in some profit-seeking activity. 14  The purpose of treating healthy and
unhealthy people similarly-by allowing the latter to deduct the costs of
health care-may be partly, or entirely, to be fair to the unhealthy. We
may do so in order to avoid taxing the unhealthy on the benefit of the good
health that others enjoy without having to pay to acquire or keep it. In
brief, the deduction of health care costs, or the exclusion from income of
health care benefits given gratuitously to those who need them, may be
akin to the deduction of losses but may also be seen as a leveling measure
for the preservation of fairness in the imposition of tax burdens.
The current Code seems to reflect this policy norm by making medical
expenses deductible and by making some, but not all, taxpayers' health
insurance tax-free (by exclusion or deduction). 15 Yet it makes these tax
adjustments unevenly, discriminating against employees whose employers
do not provide them with health insurance as an employment benefit. 
16
The ACA alters but does not repair the current tax law's incoherent
attempt to exempt medical expenses for insurance or treatment from
income tax. Indeed, it exacerbates one feature of current law that
contributes to its incoherence and introduces yet further elements of
inequality among taxpayers. It is possible that some of this inequality may
disappear as health insurance markets respond to the ACA, but any such
prediction must be based on highly speculative assumptions about those
markets.17
These shortcomings of the ACA's attempt to integrate health care
policy and tax policy expose a deeper problem related to the American
13 William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309,
331-32, 342-43 (1972). Andrews addresses only the deductibility of medical expenses, but his
argument would also support the exclusion of employer-provided health insurance to the extent that the
value of this benefit were available to all. Health, as part of the human endowment, poses a broad
problem for income taxation. The difficulty of distinguishing what is properly part of the basic human
equipment, and what is only a particular expression or use of it, forces legislators and tax
administrators to draw arbitrary boundaries between taxable and tax-exempt aspects of human capital.
See UTZ, supra note 10, at 91-96.
14 See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
'5 See I.R.C. § 213 (outlining allowable, deductible, medical expenses).
16 See I.R.S. PUB. No. 15002Q, MEDICAL & DENTAL EXPENSES 9 (Feb. 9, 2012) (providing
examples of employer-sponsored health insurance plans).
17 See HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., Focus ON HEALTH REFORM: EXPLAINING HEALTH
CARE REFORM: QUESTIONS ABOUT HEALTH INSURANCE SUBSIDIES 1 (2010), available at
http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/7962-02.pdf (discussing health insurance premium tax credits
that will be available to individuals whose employers do not provide them with insurance coverage).
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health care market. The balkanization of the health care insurance market
between large employer and small employer or single employee policy
markets makes the cost of the same health care different for different
individuals. 18  Differences attributable to market failure and monopoly
within the health insurance market prevent prices from serving as a reliable
measure of the health benefits purchased. As a consequence, the current
tax treatment of health care outlays, which treats these costs as proper
measures of what they pay for, preserves and even worsens the discrepancy
between the price and the effect of health care on the individual's well-
being.
Several very basic concepts must figure in any useful discussion of
legislative justice. The most basic is the concept of well-being, which is
the measure of how well-off a person is.' 9 If food and lodging make a
person better off than she would be without them, they increase her well-
being, and their absence would decrease her well-being. Things that are
good for a person may affect her well-being differently, some increasing it
while others detract from it. Just as importantly, things that might
separately add to her well-being may be redundant when combined. For
example, the availability of a healthy diet may improve a person's well-
being, and so may the freedom to eat according to one's tastes, but the two
in combination may not improve well-being by the sum of what each
contributed separately.
Well-being is a comparative concept.20 Levels or states of well-being
must be comparable, at least in principle. If two things contribute to one's
well-being, their contributions must be comparable in principle.21 We may
not have the information needed for doing so, but to posit that some
contributions are incommensurable would be to deny that there is a single
18 See Allison Hoffman, Oil and Water: Mixing Individual Mandates, Fragmented Markets, and
Health Reform, 36 Am. J.L. & MED. 7, 17-19 (2010) (discussing the fragmentation of the American
health care market).
19 JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT, AND MORAL IMPORTANCE 75-
76 (1989); DANIEL M. HAUSMAN & MICHAEL S. MCPHERSON, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND MORAL
PHILOSOPHY 72 (2d ed. 1996).
20 See UTZ, supra note 10, at 45-47.
21 See Daniel M. Hausman, The Impossibility of Interpersonal Utility Comparisons, 104 MIND
473, 474 (1995) ("[I1f a conception of well-being does not permit one to make interpersonal
comparisons in an acceptable way, then that conception of well-being is itself unacceptable."); see also
Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165, 205-06
(1999) ("[W]e take it to be a condition of the validity of a welfare theory that it warrants some
interpersonal comparisons of welfare .... The fact that a theory of well-being that (1) makes well-
being consist in the satisfaction of bare desires or preferences and (2) incorporates no mechanism for
translating the ordinal rankings constituted by desire or preference into some interpersonally
comparable form, leads to (3) the impossibility of interpersonal comparisons, does not imply that such
comparisons are indeed impossible. Rather, it implies that the theory is wrong.").
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measure of well-being.22 But that there should be a single measure is of
the essence of our thinking about well-being. We presuppose that there is
a common scale of well-being, when we discuss it at all.23
We make such comparisons, and presume such a common scale,
routinely.24  When I make up my mind to buy an expensive new car, I
expect to be better off owning it, despite being responsible for significant
car payments. When I observe my neighbor's purchase of a new car,
however, I think that he is mistaken in believing that it will make him
better off despite the cost. Our judgments of this sort may be fallible and
inconsistent with each other but unless there is some coherence to our
practice, the concept of "better off," or higher on the scale of well-being, is
bankrupt.25  All this suggests that it should not be hard to formulate a
theoretical account of well-being.
III. THEORIES OF WELL-BEING
A. Utility Theory
Since the early nineteenth century, theorists tried to do just that, not
through the empirical study of real people and their behavior, but as a
normative matter.26 Their goal was to generalize about how choices and
sets of beliefs and preferences must be related to each other, if choices
based on them are to be minimally rational.2 7 Utility theory is what
emerged as the consensus view of what reasonable preferences have in
22 See Matthew D. Adler, Risk, Death and Harm: The Normative Foundations of Risk Regulation,
87 MINN. L. REv. 1293, 1333 (2003) ("[l]ntrapersonal judgments of comparative well-being always
involve comparisons of multiple outcomes, at least some of which must be merely possible, not
actual.").23 See John Broome, Cost Benefit Analysis and Population, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 953, 960 (2000)
(explaining that well-being can be measured on a ratio scale); see also, e.g., John Bronsteen et al.,
Welfare as Happiness, 98 GEO. L.J. 1583, 1636-37 (2010) (discussing the variability and wealth of
information necessary to conduct one type of well-being analysis).24 See Adler & Posner, supra note 21, at 205.
25 See Hausman, supra note 21, at 476, (explaining that it is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to
quantitatively and universally determine how a person would rank their preferences on the spectrum of
well-being: "[T]here is no non-arbitrary answer to the question of whether a position in one ordinal
ranking is higher than a position in another").
26 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Marginalist Revolution in Legal Thought, 46 VAND. L. REV. 305,
309-11 (1993) (describing the progression of the utility theory of value from its origins with Jeremy
Bentham in the 1790s to William Stanley Jevons and Carl Menger and explaining that these utility
theories were completely subjective, since they were constructed upon "the individual utility function
rather than on any criterion that could be determined from the desired good itself or the environment in
which a choice was made").27 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYsIS 302-03 (1954) (tracing utility's
role is early price theory to Galiani, Say, Quesnay, Beccaria, Turgot, Verri, Condillac and Smith, whom
he characterizes as "Benthamites by anticipation").
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common.
28
Utility theory is expressed as a set of postulates about how anyone's
preferences must relate to each other in order to be rational.29 In this
regard, utility theory is normative,30 that is, it purports to prescribe what
rational preferences must be like, without presuming that the preferences
of actual people are usually or ever rational.3' Utility theory is about
people's preferences among events or states of affairs that might happen.
"Utility" is, thus, an invented concept that begins as a place-holder with no
content, and the theory tries to fill in that content.
Utility as a place-holder should not be assumed to be the same as the
pleasure or pain or the usefulness of what follows if the preferences are
realized. If Jones wants a good meal more than Jones wants to see a
movie, the utility of the event Jones-gets-a-good-meal is greater for Jones
than the utility of the event Jones-sees-a-movie, both events being
scheduled for immediate occurrence. If Jones would rather that the Red
Sox win the World Series this year (call this "event A") than that any other
team win it ("event B"), the utility for Jones of event A is greater than the
utility for Jones of event B. We can sometimes speak of things, rather than
events, as having utility,33 but today utility is commonly understood to
belong to things only as they relate to events.34 For example, an apple can
have greater utility for me than a plum would, but what that really means is
that my eating an apple would satisfy a stronger preference of mine than
the event of my eating a plum.
We must not confuse utility with the anticipated pleasure or happiness
an event will cause someone. A person can strongly prefer things that will
28See JOHN BROOME, WEIGHING GOODS: EQUALITY, UNCERTAINTY AND TIME 91 (1991)
("[U]tility theory intends to describe the preferences a person would have if she were rational.").29 See DANIEL M. HAUSMAN, THE INEXACT AND SEPARATE SCIENCE OF ECONOMICS 18 (1992)
(describing the theory of rational preference).
'°Id. at 19.
3' HAUSMAN & MCPHERSON, supra note 19, at 49.
32 UTZ, supra note 10, at 46.
33 See Daniel Kahneman, Experienced Utility and Objective Happiness: A Moment-Based
Approach, in CHOICES, VALUES AND FRAMES 673, 673 (D. Kahneman & A. Tversky eds., 2000) ("As
Bentham (1789) used it, utility refers to the experiences of pleasure and pain, the 'sovereign masters'
that 'point out what we ought to do, as well as determine what we shall do."'); Arie Kapteyn, Utility
and Economics, 133 DE ECONOMIST 1, 1 (1985) ("By utility is meant that property in any object,
whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good or happiness .... ); see generally John
Broome, "Utility", 7 ECON. & PHIL. 1 (1991).
34 See Kahneman, supra note 33, at 673 ("In modem decision research, however, the utility of
outcomes refers to their weight in decisions: utility is inferred from observed choices and is in turn used
to explain choices."); Kapteyn, supra note 33, at 2 ("In modem economic theory, this is not the
common way the utility concept is introduced. Nowadays the preference ordering is taken as a
primitive term. An individual's preference ordering ranks alternatives in order of preference ...
'Utility' is no longer a primitive term, but it is defined in terms of preferences [of actions or
decisions].").
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not cause her pleasure or happiness, at least as pleasure and happiness are
normally understood.35 A remorseful wrongdoer may prefer to be caught
and punished, even though in every ordinary sense of the word, this would
not make him happy or cause him pleasure. To say that being caught
would give him a special kind of pleasure or happiness stretches the
meaning of these words so much that it is better just to coin a new term-
and that is why "utility" is introduced.
The formal character of utility-that anything can have higher or lower
utility as long as this is the individual's preference-is both a highly prized
feature of utility theory and a source of trouble for it.36 If utility is formal
rather than substantive, we can lay down no rules about the relative value
of earlier or later events in someone's life, and, in particular, we cannot
assume or insist that what happens later is of greater value than what
happens earlier. This leads to a paradox, however: we can say that the total
utility of A's life experiences is greater than the total utility of B's life
experiences even though A's preferences were satisfied only in early life
and not at all in later life, and B's "hard" early years were succeeded by a
completely happy later life. Since this is possible in a purely formal utility
theory, it would follow that someone could rationally pursue an early-
good-later-bad set of outcomes. This seems paradoxical.
Other paradoxes that we will not examine here beset the formal
character of utility theory.3 7 It is enough to say that the hoped-for
advantages of a relatively undemanding formal theory of rational
preference have not been clearly achieved. Yet utility theory continues to
be used in economic theorizing, including tax policy analysis, despite this
shortcoming.38 What is its significance? That utility theory is not free of
implicit normative bias, at least as applied by even pure theorists, when
they begin to consider concrete examples.
Another respect in which utility theory has been seen as normative is
the common assumption of the possibility of "interpersonal comparisons"
of utility.39 Some, not all, believe that since no way of measuring degrees
35 See Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103,
112-13 (1979) ("The chief thing which the common-sense individual actually wants is not satisfactions
for the wants which he has, but more, and better wants.").36 See HAUSMAN & MCPHERSON, supra note 19, 119-28 (explaining that individual experiences
cannot be compared but even if it is assumed that individual experiences can be compared, and doing
so would enhance social utility, it does not follow that individuals ought to compare their experiences);
DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 365-66 (1986).
37 HAUSMAN & MCPHERSON, supra note 19, at 55-59 (discussing Allais's paradox and other
controversies concerning utility theory).
38 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Taxation, in I HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 647, 652-70
(Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).
" See JAMES A. MIRRLEES, The Economic Uses of Utilitarianism, in WELFARE, INCENTIVES AND
TAXATION 69, 75-79 (James A. Mirrlees ed., 2006) (applying the utility of an individual to evaluate
societal outcomes where individuals are identical); see also Ian B. Lee, Efficiency and Ethics in the
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of utility permits the utility of an event for one person to be compared with
the utility of an event for another person, the utility of the same event
(whether ordinal or cardinal) for more than one person is unknowable.4 °
Lionel Robbins famously declared that this makes utility a "normative"
concepf, in the sense that we must postulate that the impossible is in fact
possible.4' If this means anything, it is that when we say of a group of
people, for example, the population of this country, that they are better off
if their drinking water is fluoridated than if it is not, we are treating what
people say about their preferences as good enough evidence of objectively
shared preferences to put our doubts about inter-subjective comparisons of
utility to rest.
42
When not concerned with these foundational aspects of utility theory,
economists have often been content to assume that the prices people would
be willing to pay for goods and services, as revealed indirectly by the
prices they do actually pay, in turn reveal the utility these goods and
services have for the individuals in question. On these assumptions,
welfare becomes shorthand for economic results. Naturally, recourse to
consumer behavior as a reliable measure of utility and well-being is
usually hedged round with caveats. But it persists as a routine element in
cost-benefit analysis, the vernacular counterpart of utility theory.43
B. Alternatives to Utility Theory
In recent years, this traditional conception of welfare has come in for
strong criticism, much of it from economists themselves. 44 Some have
emphasized that this overly individualistic approach to understanding
welfare leaves out social factors that may be central to an individual's
well-being. John Rawls grounds his Theory of Justice in a thorough-going
Debate About Shareholder Primacy, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 533, 569 (2006) ("Because the costs and
benefits fall on different groups, any assessment of the net social welfare impact is prima facie
impossible without an interpersonal utility comparison, and such comparisons are impermissible within
welfare economics.").
40 See LIONEL ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE
125-26 (1932) (giving an example of a line of thought stemming from comparing human experience).
41 See loannis Lianos, 'Judging' Economists: Economic Expertise in Competition Law Litigation:
A European View, in THE REFORM OF EC COMPETITION LAW: NEW CHALLENGES 185, 207 n.142
(loannis Lianos & loannis Kokkoris eds., 2010) (noting that Robbins believed utility to be a normative
rather than descriptive question).
42 See ROBBINS, supra note 40, at 122-24 (discussing how the theory of exchange compares
orders of preferences among different people, but also how there is no way to test the satisfaction of
two separate people).43 See HAUSMAN & MCPHERSON, supra note 19, at 94-99.
44 See, e.g., Yew-Kwang Ng, From Preference to Happiness: Towards a More Complete Welfare
Economics 1-5 (Feb. 2000), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=222059
(criticizing preference utilitarianism as failing to go deeper to analyze the overall welfare of an
individual).
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critique of utility theory as a theory of well-being.45 Rawls's conclusion is
that some "goods" or types of aspiration cannot be placed on the same
scale, and hence, well-being must not be a matter of outcomes.46 He
advances a view of well-being that measures government's impact on well-
being in terms of the opportunities government makes available, with
outcomes as a somewhat remote factor to be considered in evaluating these
opportunities.47 By contrast with classical utility theory, Rawls replaces
what a person actually gets out of life with what a person has the chance of
getting out of life as the criterion of fairness and justice.48 Note that Rawls
does not try to formulate a more fundamental theory of well-being, one
that could be used to explain what it is to be better or worse off apart from
society's intervention in our lives.
Amartya Sen, an important rival to Rawls, thinks that both opportunity
and outcomes are important.49 Sen believes that this is due in part to the
failure of welfarism (as he calls the economists' conception of welfare
preference satisfaction) to take into account the role of the individual's
capacities in determining how well-off the individual is.50 Someone
without the ability to do things for himself or herself cannot be said to be
as well-off, Sen believes, as someone with basic life skills as well as other
skills that may be prized in the particular society.5 Education, in our
society, arguably vies with the size of your paycheck as a determinant of
your welfare in this broader sense that Sen has tried to identify. Since his
conception of welfare places that notion somewhere between an exclusive
emphasis on the intrinsic value of preference satisfaction, i.e., a pure
result-oriented view of welfare, and an opportunity or ability view, it has
been dubbed "midfare" by friendly commentators.52
Given the non-match of well-being with preference satisfaction, how
relevant are economic data in measuring well-being? Market values are
45 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 177-78 (1971) (arguing that when the principle of
utility is satisfied, there is no guarantee that everyone in society will benefit).
46 See id. at 92-93 (explaining that rational individuals value certain primary goods, such as
rights, liberties, and opportunities over other goods).
47 See id. at 275 (advocating that government should create equal opportunities for all individuals
throughout society by engaging in activities such as establishing public schools, policing private firms
to prevent monopolies, and providing a social safety net).
48 See id. at 259-60 ("[A just] social system shapes the wants and aspirations that its citizens
come to have. It determines the sort of persons they want to be as well as the sort of persons they
are.").49 See AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 18-19 (2009) (describing the importance of social
realizations and individual capabilities in ensuring well-being).
50 See id at 278 (discussing how welfarism suffers from a lack of interpersonal comparisons of
utility amongst individuals).
51 Cf id. at 282-83 (suggesting that the utility experienced by a disadvantaged person is not the
same as a more fortunate individual in society because the former learns to adjust their desires and
expectations downward).
52 JOHN E. ROEMER, THEORIES OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 189 (1996).
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themselves not trustworthy guides even to preference satisfaction, which is
the underlying subject matter of utility theory, because competitive
markets set prices that correspond to the strength of the marginal
purchaser's preference, ignoring the possibly greater preferences (utilities)
of intramarginal purchasers.53 But even this shortcoming does not hint at
the gross discrepancy Sen identified between well-being (or quality of life)
and market results. Early on, relying on his expertise as a development
economist, Sen pointed out that despite the steady and rapid growth of
individual income in the early industrial revolution, more people endured
more suffering than during the pre-industrial period. 54 While the utility-
based conception of welfare does not necessarily equate higher incomes
with improved welfare, it tends to favor that view because money is the
chief instrument by which people in a market-dominated society can
satisfy their preferences. The greater ability to satisfy market-oriented
preferences that industrialization has brought, Sen argues convincingly,
cannot be said to increase welfare.5"
Another critique of welfarism indicts that concept's insensitivity to the
importance of planning, effort, and self-determination in making people
better off, not just because these things lead to preference satisfaction, but
as valuable objectives themselves.56 This thought is obviously close to
Sen's emphasis on the mix of capacities and consequences in determining
welfare, but it also hints at a formal defect in welfare based on utility
theory. Planning and effort seem to have no place in a view of welfare that
finds value in preference satisfaction, at least if separable utility functions
are the benchmark for measuring preference satisfaction. This is because
separable utility functions rule out process-oriented preferences. There is
nothing wrong, in this view, with identifying welfare with preference
satisfaction, but preferences must be allowed to include preferences that
events succeed each other in a certain way. Such linked-event preferences,
however, are non-separable and hence are beyond the scope of welfare as
economics has theorized about it.
It is worthy of note that these criticisms of traditional welfarism pose a
challenge to traditional tax policy.57 In particular, the criticisms imply (1)
53 For a discussion of marginal utility, the principle that each additional unit of a good is worth
less to the consumer than previous units, see DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY: AN INTERMEDIATE
TEXT 82-85 (2d ed. 1990).
54 AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 72-74 (1999).
55 Id. at 69
56 See id. at 68 ("[The assumption of common preference and choice behavior is quite often made
in applied welfare economics, and this is frequently used to justify the assumption that everyone has the
same utility function .... Is that presumption legitimate for the interpretation of utility as a numerical
representation of preference? The answer, unfortunately, is in the negative.").
57 See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 45, at 278-79 ("[A] proportional expenditure tax... is preferable
to an income tax (of any kind) . . . [and] treats everyone in a uniform way .... It may be better,
therefore, to use progressive rates only when they are necessary to preserve the justice of the basic
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that economic losses, including deadweight losses, cannot be
unequivocally treated as losses in collective well-being58 and (2) that the
ability-to-pay approach, as utility theory reframed this originally grass-
roots conception, is not at all helpful in analyzing the very difficulties for
which it was first introduced, viz., situations in which tax burdens as
burdens on well-being are not un-controversially captured by market
values.59
C. What Measure Should We Use?
These meritorious criticisms of utility theory have not yet enabled
theorists to formulate a better measure of well-being. We may have
learned something about what well-being is not, but this has left us in
doubt about what it is. The inconclusive status quo yields another
disappointment, though one for which the criticisms of utility theory are
not responsible. Theorists of taxation and other aspects of public policy
have become so accustomed to the metrical advantages of utility theory
that they continue using it, despite its acknowledged defects.60  To some
extent, continued use is justified in modeling analyses of the economic
effects of isolated features of tax design, because models are invariably
qualified by ceteris paribus provisos that caution their audience against
drawing any strong practical conclusions from them.6' Yet less
streamlined discussion of broad issues of public policy cannot reasonably
proceed without taking account of the criticisms of utility theory, which
effectively means adopting a different understanding of well-being.
structure with respect to the first principle of justice and fair equality of opportunity .... Following this
rule might help to signal an important distinction in questions of policy.").
58 See Stephen Utz, Ability to Pay, 23 WHITTIER L. REv. 867, 921 (2002) (noting that, in his
review of the merits of ability to pay doctrine, Richard Musgrave "showed that the attempts of Mill and
others to define equal sacrifice functionally ran aground in the shallows of the utilitarian analysis of
welfare (welfarism).").
59 See RAWLS, supra note 45, at 279-80 ("No mention has been made at any point of the
traditional criteria of taxation such as that taxes are to be levied according to ... ability to pay. The
reference to common sense precepts in connection with expenditure taxes is a subordinate
consideration.... [T]he conventional maxims are seen to have no independent force ... Inheritance
and progressive income taxes, for example, are not predicated on the idea that individuals have similar
utility functions."); Utz, supra note 58, at 869-70 ("The greater one's ability to pay, the higher the fair
tax, and perhaps the higher the fair rate of tax. This much is commonly accepted.... Despite this,...
no useful formulation of ability to pay has escaped devastating criticism.").
6 See, e.g., John Creedy & Nicolas H&ault, Welfare-Improving Income Tax Reforms: A
Microsimulation Analysis, 64 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 128, 129 (2012) ("A... fundamental difficulty
arises in specifying a suitable welfare metric and social welfare function. In the basic optimal tax
model, this is straightforward given the choice of cardinalization of utility.").
61 See, e.g., Sarah B. Lawsky, On the Edge: Declining Marginal Utility and Tax Policy, 95 MINN.
L. REv. 904, 914 (2011) ("A moderately egalitarian social welfare function would weight the utility of
the less well-off more than the utility of the more well-off, because, all else being equal, such a
function would recommend redistribution from the better-off person to the worse-off person.").
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The problem of reconciling the effects of different areas of public
policy on individuals' well-being can highlight the inadequacy of utility
theory. Where health care policy and taxation are concerned, government
reliance on private health insurance markets to implement public policy
makes the problem of reconciliation particularly difficult.62 While market
prices may sometimes accurately reflect consumer surplus,63 they are
unlikely to do so in the markets that provide health insurance in this
country, and even less likely to measure well-being accurately.
64
If well-being could simply be identified with utility, and the utility of
an outcome could be assumed to be accurately measured by the market
price an individual pays or would pay to bring that outcome about,65 then
the cost of health insurance would accurately reflect how insurance affects
the well-being of those who buy or receive insurance as a job perk. In this
country, however, the price of private health insurance depends upon
whether an employer provides the health insurance or upon whether the
insured buys the insurance directly from an insurer.66 Before the ACA, it
also depended upon whether the insured had a pre-existing medical
condition and other factors that are peculiarities of the historical
development of U.S. health insurance markets.67 These price differences
seem irrelevant to the contribution the insurance makes to well-being of
the insured.68 Therefore, the prices of health insurance contracts are not
62 See Stephen Utz, Federalism in Health Care: A Policy Overview, 3 Hous. J. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 161, 167 (2003) ("Private insurers are concerned about the adequacy of a health care package
only as a side issue. Their primary concern is profit, which economic theory teaches us cannot be
expected to lead in the health field maximization of the general welfare.").63 N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 138-39 (4th ed. 2007).
64 See WILLIAM KENNETH BELLINGER, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC POLICY 30 (2007)
(noting the problems associated with basing individual well-being in utility theory); A. MITCHELL
POLINSKY, HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 506 (2007) ("Although basic economic (utility)
theory posits that individual well-being is a function of the satisfaction of individual preferences, this
notion has been debated in other disciplines, including psychology and philosophy .... [Q]uestions
have been raised about whether societal gains and losses can be expressed through the simple
aggregation of welfare changes of individuals. Some have argued that other factors should be
considered in a measure of social well-being....").
65 See MANKIW, supra note 63, at 139, 143 (outlining the general conclusions drawn about
economic well-being from prices set according to consumer surplus measures).
66 See, e.g., Comparison of Expenditures in Nongroup and Employer-Sponsored Insurance: 2004-
2007, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (March 2010), http://www.kff.org/insurance/snapshot/chcm I 11006oth.cfm
("[NMongroup policies are providing less coverage than employer-sponsored insurance.").
6 7 See DAVID F. DRAKE, REFORMING THE HEALTH CARE MARKET: AN INTERPRETIVE ECONOMIC
HISTORY 17-20 (1994) (presenting an analysis of the development of the modem health insurance
market with a particular focus upon the development of current cost estimating problems).
68 See Willard G. Manning et al., Health Insurance and the Demand for Medical Care, 77 AM.
ECON. REV. 251, 265 (1987) (concluding that less favorable health care coverage does not decrease the
overall health of the covered individual).
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reliable proxies for the size of the effects on well-being such health care
coverage provides.69
D. How Should We Think About Well-Being in Designing Health Care
Policy?
Private health insurance may also pose a further problem for
measuring well-being. Even though insurance coverage may improve an
individual's well-being, actual receipt of insurance benefits may have a
further effect on the recipient's well-being. People who have such
insurance, and have reason to believe they will not need it, may choose not
to purchase insurance;7° they therefore appear, by the equation of utility
with preference satisfaction, to enjoy no utility gain by virtue of having
health care coverage.7 People with a family history of ill health or some
other adverse risk factor are apparently better off both by virtue of having
coverage and by virtue of any actual benefits they receive. Coverage alone
should satisfy a preference and receiving actual benefits-not an inevitable
consequence of coverage or risk factors-appears to be a separate addition
to such an individual's well-being. It is tempting to say that coverage and
actual benefits are not separate events and therefore should not be allowed
to have cognizably distinct effects on anyone's well-being.72  The
occurrence of the word "should" in the previous sentence, however, alerts
us to the danger that this proposition is a norm of unexplained provenance.
Where fairness is concerned, however, it is certain that we should not
count both coverage and the receipt of benefits as additions to well-being.73
The historical dimension of health care policy also deserves notice in
this context. If health care were not capable of making large differences in
our lives, any attempt by individuals or their governments to provide health
benefits would have only a panacea effect.74 This result might increase
69 See Michael E. Porter & Elizabeth Olmsted Teisberg, Redefining Competition in Health Care,
HARv. Bus. REV., June 2004, at 64, 66-67 (2004) (arguing that the insurance industry's competition
should occur at the level of prevention and treatment and should not focus upon costs).
70 See, e.g., TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW & POLICY 6 (2d ed. 2008) (explaining the general
principle of adverse selection and using the health of the insurance applicant as a primary example).
71 See BELLINGER, supra note 64, at 59-70 (analyzing the relationship between consumption and
utility).
72 See Jay A. Soled, Taxation of Employer-Provided Health Coverage: Inclusion, Timing, and
Policy Issues, 15 VA. TAX REV. 447, 454 (1996) ("In assessing a person's material well-
being... [e]xpenditures made to attain this baseline [termed 'good health'] do not represent real
consumption insofar as the person making such expenditures is no better off than his healthy, untaxed
peers.").
" See id. ( "In fact ... the exact opposite is true: as evidenced by [a] person's medical
expenditures, the person lacks material well-being and, therefore, has less of an ability to pay tax.").
74 See Amy B. Monahan, The Promise and Peril of Ownership Society Health Care Policy, 80
TUL. L. REV. 777, 779 (2006) (noting that "[t]he United States spends more on health care than any
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collective and individual well-being but the effect would be much less
significant than that of efficacious health care. Fairness would be a slight
concern. The opposite seems true of societies, like those of the wealthy
countries of our time, which can easily provide effective health care at an
affordable governmental CoSt. 75  Yet it is not true generally that when a
society can provide a benefit, its refusal to do so must be regarded as
unfair.76
Given these complicating factors, the reconciliation of health care
policy and tax policy would be easiest if all health care were provided in
kind by the government. Although the treatment actually received would
differ, because health needs differ and no rationally administered health
care system would provide the same treatment to all without regard to
need,77 the goal of the system would be to bring every individual to the
same basic level of good health, so that while some individuals would
benefit more than others, all would be brought as nearly as possible to the
same basic health endowment. There would be no private health care
market with respect to what is necessary for this goal, although there could
conceivably be a private health care market for other unnecessary
treatment (e.g., elective cosmetic surgery). The ability of individuals to
achieve the same basic health endowment would not depend on their
incomes or other economic attributes, and there would accordingly be no
need to adjust income tax rules to avoid discrepant treatment that would
burden some taxpayers more than others in ways that might affect their
other country both on a per capita basis and as a share of national income, yet our health outcomes lag
behind many other countries who spend far less").
75 But see Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., Restoring Health to Health Reform: Integrating Medicine
and Public Heath to Advance the Population's Well-Being, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1777, 1781 (2011)
(noting that the United States ranks thirty-seventh among global health systems, falling "behind
countries with half the income and half the health care expenditures per capita").
76 See Erika Blacksher et al., Public Values, Health Inequality, and Alternative Notions of a
"Fair" Response, 35 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 889, 890-91 (2010) (contrasting government action
to remedy health care in England, where "health inequalities are cast as unfair and their remedy a
matter of social justice," with that of the United States, where "arguments grounded in notions of
fairness would be unhelpful . . . [because] most Americans value individual traits such as initiative,
freedom, and self-reliance" that create "a greater willingness to tolerate economic inequalities");
Amanda Littell, Note, Can a Constitutional Right to Health Guarantee Universal Health Care
Coverage or Improved Health Outcomes?: A Survey of Selected States, 35 CONN. L. REV. 289, 307-08
(2002) (arguing that the U.S. Constitution "does not provide a right to health or health care" and that
although the preamble "recognizes the state duty to promote the public good, the text leaves the
implementation of this duty to legislative discretion" (footnote omitted)).
77 For the locus classicus of the theory that health care markets inevitably fail to function in
accordance with the classical view of markets because of information asymmetry between providers
and patients, see Kenneth Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 Am.
ECON. REV. 941 (1963). See also UTZ, supra note 10, at 167-74 (outlining how "important features of
governmentally financed health benefits are shaped by the decisions of private firms" and discussing
the often competing and distinct goals of cost containment, efficiency, and expanding health insurance
coverage).
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receipt of the basic health care provided under the government health
program.
Fairness in health care requires that individuals have an equal realistic
opportunity to achieve the same level of health care-the same basic health
care endowment. Medical science does not make it possible for everyone
to become equally healthy, even if unlimited resources were available to
deliver the best possible health care. Some diseases cannot be cured; some
congenital health defects are irreversible. It seems reasonable to assume,
however, that if everything possible is done to prevent health endowment
differences from affecting the quality of peoples' lives, that is all fairness
requires. If a government provided system of health care met this standard,
the government's intervention in the health of the population would satisfy
the demands of justice, without having to be coordinated with any other
government intervention in the lives of the population, such as the
imposition of tax burdens.
Although this proposition concerning the fairness or justice of a
governmentally sponsored health care system does not specify a metric of
well-being capable of replacing utility-based explications of well-being, it
does provide a different kind of measuring rod for assessing the fairness of
other governmentally sponsored health care systems.
IV. THE INTERACTION OF HEALTH CARE AND TAX PROGRAMS UNDER
THE ACA
The principled integration of health care and tax concerns for fairness
and efficiency raises some of the most intransigent public policy issues. If
a society provides no health care benefits at all for its members, but
imposes any taxes, the tax burden may hinder the fair or efficient delivery
of health care by the private sector. If the government acts by nontax
measures to better private sector health care delivery, to make it fairer or to
improve it in some other respect, it must take into account both health care
needs as they might stand in the absence of taxation and the effect of taxes
on improving or worsening the pre-tax situation.78 Provision of health care
benefits directly by the government of course could avoid part of the
problem of rectifying the complex effect of taxes on private health care
markets. 79 Government subsidies and penalties intended to persuade
individuals and markets to achieve rational public health care goals must
cope with behavior that is unlikely to be entirely rational, given the
78 See Arrow, supra note 77, at 947-48.
79 See Clark C. Havighurst & Barak D. Richman, The Provider Monopoly Problem in Health
Care, 89 OR. L. REV. 847, 858-61, 866-67 (2011) (discussing some of the tax issues encountered by
private health care providers).
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proverbial informational asymmetry between providers and consumers.8 °
But it must also evaluate and, if necessary, adjust tax burdens that would
gum the works of otherwise reasonable governmental intervention in
private health care transactions.
Fairness 81, where health care is concerned, must be based on need. A
fair health care system does not foist treatment on those who do not need
it, and cannot wait until the needs of all are evident before responding to
emergencies. Differentiated treatment can nevertheless be fair if it brings
all individuals to the same level of good health or provides the same level
of care to the dying and to those whose health cannot be brought up to a
desirable level. A fair tax system, on the other hand, is arguably one that
imposes equal burdens or exacts equal sacrifices from all individuals,
where burden or sacrifice means utility loss. In other words, a dominant
tradition in tax policy has interpreted fairness in terms of welfare measured
by utility. Other views of welfare seem more appropriate for the
development of an acceptable public health care policy precisely because
the final impact of such a policy on different individuals, in treatment
terms, must attempt to reflect differences in the utility of specific health
care interventions for different individuals.
Income taxation has a peculiar feature that stands in the way of
achieving fairness in both health care and taxation: it intentionally burdens
currently funded consumption.82 Consumption taxes and sales taxes
deliberately burden consumption even more broadly because they do not
limit their application to currently funded consumption.83  Experts
generally agree that the benefit of reasonable health care maintenance is
not consumption and should not be taxed as such.84 But sophisticated
income tax systems in countries like the United States that do not provide
health care through single-payer systems do not live up to this aspiration.
80 See id at 1419-22 (discussing the information problem between consumers, providers, and
society as one of the endemic problems of the health care industry).
81 John Rawls famously argued for "justice as fairness," with the connotation that the former and
the latter are not interchangeable concepts. HAUSMAN & MCPHERSON, supra note 19, at 203-06. This
Article uses "fairness" as a synonym for justice or equal treatment of those under the sway of
government, and not as a special version of either of these; it does not assume fairness is necessarily
Rawlsian.
82 See Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax over
an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413, 1418 (2006) (explaining that a direct tax on earnings
reduces the value of the dollar earned, leaving an individual with less to spend).83 See Edward J. McCaffery, A New Understanding of Tax, 103 MICH. L. REV. 807, 824-25
(2005) (discussing postpaid consumption taxation).
84 See, e.g., William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV.
309, 335-36 (1972) (justifying medical services deductions by viewing "medical expenses like a loss of
earnings"); Michael Grossman, On the Concept of Health Capital and the Demand for Health, 80 J.
POL. ECON. 223, 225 (arguing that health functions uniquely as both a consumption and investment
commodity); McCaffery, supra note 83, at 839 (arguing that consumption of medical expenses does not
fit the traditional understanding of consumption).
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These countries must adjust tax burdens on consumption by exempting
taxpayers' acquisition of health care from the income tax, and this is not
easily done.
William D. Andrews and subsequent commentators have argued that
medical expenses should be deductible, or recoveries that pay these
expenses should be excluded, because they restore the individual's basic
endowment, the starting point from which income should be measured.
The current Code seems to reflect this policy norm by making medical
expenses deductible, and by making some, but not all, taxpayers' health
insurance tax-free (by exclusion or deduction),86 but it provides this
treatment unequally, discriminating primarily against employees whose
employers do not provide them with health insurance as an employment
benefit.8 7 The ACA would change this apparently incoherent attempt to
exempt medical expenses for insurance or treatment from income tax,8 but
it exacerbates one feature of current law that contributes to its incoherence
and introduces further elements of inequality among taxpayers. It may be
that some of this inequality would be expected to disappear as health
insurance markets respond to the ACA, but any prediction to that effect
would be based on highly speculative assumptions about those markets.
These weaknesses in the ACA's gesture towards integrating health
care policy and tax policy expose a deeper problem related to American
health care markets. The balkanization of the health care insurance market
between large employer and small employer or single employee policy
markets makes the cost of the same health care different for different
individuals. 89 These differences prevent costs from reflecting the value of
the health care to the individuals. Hence, the tax treatment of these costs
preserves the discrepancy between the price and the effect of health care on
the individual's well-being.
The approach taken by the pre-ACA income tax was notably
inequitable. Although all individuals were allowed to deduct their outlays
s5 See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 13, at 335-37; Thomas D. Griffith, Theories of Personal
Deductions in the Income Tax, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 343, 393-94 (1989) (advocating medical expense tax
deductibility or tax credit); Stanley A. Koppelman, Personal Deductions Under an Ideal Income Tax,
43 TAX L. REV. 679, 711-13 (1988) (justifying a tax deduction for medical expenses).
86 See STEPHEN UTZ, INSIDE TAX LAW: WHAT MATTERS AND WHY 202-03 (2011).
87 Id.
88 Robert Pear & Steven Greenhouse, Accord Reached on Insurance Tax for Costly Plans, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 15, 2010, at Al (noting that a 40% excise tax on purchase by employer of more expensive
health care insurance for employees will be passed on to employees); Robert Pear, In Health Bill For
Everyone, Provisions For a Few, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2010, at A10 (outlining anticipated preservation
of special treatment under the ACA for employer-sponsored health care plans).
89 See, e.g., KAISER FAM. FOUND. & HEALTH, RESEARCH & EDUC. TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH
BENEFITS: 2011 SURVEY RESULTS 1, 20 (2011), available at http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/2011/8225.pdf
(citing survey results showing average premiums are lower for workers in small firms than for those in
large firms).
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on most non-elective kinds of health care treatment, these deductions were
limited arbitrarily by thresholds based on the taxpayer's adjusted gross
income ("AGI"),90 a feature of the taxpayer's taxable income calculation
that has no relationship to health care needs. To make matters worse, the
value of employer-provided health insurance, which would otherwise be
included in employees' income, has long been excluded from employees'
income. 91 As a consequence, taxpayers who must buy health insurance for
themselves pay with post-tax dollars, and their health care is therefore
treated as taxable consumption, while taxpayers whose employers provide
them with health insurance effectively "buy" this insurance with pre-tax
dollars, and their health care is not treated as taxable consumption.
Section 213 (as it still stands, though scheduled for change) allows a
deduction for medical expenses that are not reimbursed by insurance, to the
extent that they exceed 7.5% of the taxpayer's AGI.92  These include
expenses for "medical care," defined with some specificity as "amounts
paid . . . for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of
disease, or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the
body," as well as related transportation, prescription drugs and insulin, and
certain qualified long-term care.93 The IRS now interprets "treatment...
of disease" to include in-home services for the care of a chronically ill
person, including elderly people with senile dementia or Alzheimer's
disease.94 Insurance for medical care, as defined, and for long-term care
can also be deducted. 95 But the 7.5% threshold is so high that most
medical expenses, though deductible, yield no tax benefit.
96
An exclusion of the value of employer-provided health and accident
insurance 97 and of the benefits received under such insurance contracts
98
plays a larger role than the medical expense deduction and costs the
government a huge amount in foregone tax revenue. Self-employed
individuals can deduct the full cost of health insurance against their income
from the self-employment,99 limited only by the deduction for part of the
90 I.R.C. §§ 62, 213(a) (2006).
91 Id. § 106; see UTZ, supra note 10, at 50.
92 I.R.C. § 213(a).
9 3 d. § 213(d).
94 I.R.S. PUB. No. 15002Q, supra note 16, at 2, 11.
9' See I.R.C. § 213(d)(1) (defining the term "medical care" as amount paid for the treatment or
prevention of disease including "qualified long term services").
96 Mary Beth Franklin, The Challenge of Deducting Medical Expenses, KIPLINGER'S PERSONAL
FINANCE (Feb. 18, 2011), http://www.kiplinger.con/coluns/taxtips/archive/deducting-medical-
expenses.html.
17 See I.R.C. § 106(a) (explaining that an employee's AGI does not include "employer-provided
coverage under an accident or health plan").
" Id. § 104(a)(3).
99 I.R.S. PuB. No. 15002Q, supra note 16, at 24.
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self-employment tax they pay,'00 which is a surrogate for wage
withholding and roughly equal to it. The upshot is that only employees
without employer-provided health insurance are disfavored,0 ° mainly by
the 7.5% AGI threshold for deducting health insurance premiums.
For example, Jack and Jill, unrelated taxpayers, both have health care
insurance. Jack's employer provides him with comprehensive health
insurance as an employment benefit. Jill's smaller employer does not, and
so Jill buys health insurance for herself and her family with her wages.
Jack does not have to report the value of the employer-provided health
insurance as gross income for income tax purposes. Jill is entitled to
deduct the cost of her insurance on Schedule A as a medical expense, but
its cost does not exceed 7.5% of her AGI, and so she effectively pays tax
on her insurance because she pays for it with after-tax dollars.
The ACA preserves this discrepancy in tax treatment and worsens it in
several respects. Under the ACA, the threshold for deducting medical
expenses from 7.5% of AGI increases to 10% in 2014, and the burden on
uninsured expenses of chronically ill and for end-of-life in-home care are
thereby also increased.102 On the other hand, the ACA reduces the putative
consumption component of expensive plans by taxing insurers that provide
them.I0 3
The ACA also imposes additional limits on "health savings accounts"
("HSAs") and "flexible spending accounts" ("FSAs"), 1°4 burdening
employees without employer-provided insurance.'0 5 The significance of
these limitations can best be understood in terms of the contrast between
what a particular health insurance contract covers and what the insured
must pay out of pocket (amounts for which participating health care
providers receive no compensation fiom the insurer or the insured are not
in question here). Even if a taxpayer receives health insurance as a benefit
that need not be included in gross income for tax purposes, co-pays and
deductibles normally come out of the taxpayer's taxed income, just as all
the cost of insurance, co-pays and deductibles come out of the taxed
'
00 I.R.C.§ 1401.
101 I.R.S. PUB. No. 15002Q, supra note 16, at24.
0226 U.S.C.A. § 213 (West 2003 & Supp. 2011).
103 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091.
104 See Affordable Care Act: Questions and Answers on Over-the-Counter Medicines and Drugs,
IRS, http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=227308,00.html (last updated Feb. 1, 2012) (noting
that under the ACA, FSAs will only cover over-the-counter medicines purchased with a prescription,
except for insulin, and that only these two classes of medicines will receive the preferred tax treatment
that HSAs afford).
105 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX- 17-10, ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF THE AMENDMENT
IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE TO H.R. 4872, THE "RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010," AS AMENDED,
IN COMBINATION WITH THE REVENUE EFFECTS OF H.R. 3590, THE "PATIENT PROTECTION AND
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT ('PPACA')," AS PASSED BY THE SENATE, AND SCHEDULED FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE HOUSE COMM. ON RULES ON MAR. 20,2010, 111 th Cong. (2010).
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income of taxpayers who do not receive excludible health coverage as an
employment benefit. 10 6 Either sort of taxpayer, however, can now avoid
some of the tax burden on these out-of-pocket payments if he or she has an
HSA or an FSA. With some restrictions, each of these devices allows the
taxpayer to divert a certain portion of the wages he or she will receive for
the coming year from inclusion in gross income.0 7 The amounts diverted
can then be used only for statutorily permitted purposes (health care only
in the case of the HSA and health care among other purposes for the
FSA).'18 The functional outcome is that amounts paid from these pre-tax
accounts are never taxed, and co-pays and deductibles are relieved of tax
burden.
The ACA, as these details show, gestures at tax equity for participants
in private health care markets by making adjustments that depend on
irrelevant attributes of health care recipients (e.g., their AGI or whether
their employers provide health care insurance) just as earlier tax law did.
Equal access to beneficial health care is the gold standard of equal
treatment, and the tweaking of ill-assorted deductions and unjustified
exclusions is, by that standard, at best a placebo, perhaps even a harmful
counterfeit. If there is any value to these features of the ACA, it is the
implicit acknowledgment that tax burdens matter and that the tax law falls
short of one of its most basic goals, the equitable distribution of tax
burdens, when governmental health care policy makes post-tax income a
significant determinant of access to health care.
What is glaringly absent from the ACA is an acknowledgment that
equal treatment for all requires that some basic package of health care
benefits be given to everyone, untrammeled by economic hurdles. The
Internal Revenue Code is not the ideal location for rules designed to
achieve this, and indeed the ACA makes no serious effort to use it as such.
Unfortunately, there is evidence that the expanded availability of health
insurance to those with pre-existing conditions is already falling short of its
goal because some who qualify cannot afford to take buy the available
coverage.10 9
'o' See I.R.C. § 106(a) (providing that "gross income of an employee does not include employer-
provided coverage under [a] . . . health plan"); id. § 105(a) ("[A]mounts received by an employee
through ... health insurance for personal injuries or sickness shall be included in gross income to the
extent such amounts (1) are attributable to contributions by the employer which were not includible in
the gross income of the employee, or (2) are paid by the employer.").
107 See id. §§ 125, 223 (setting limited deductions for "Cafeteria Plans" and "Health Savings
Accounts," respectively).
108 Id.
109 ROBIN A. COHEN ET AL., FINANCIAL BURDEN OF MEDICAL CARE: EARLY RELEASE OF
ESTIMATES FROM THE NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY, JANUARY-JUNE 2011 1 (March 2012),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/financial-burden-of medical care
032012.pdf (many cannot afford health care despite the ACA's extension of health insurance
availability); see Ann Carms, Many Americans Struggling to Pay Medical Bills, BUCKS (March 18,
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Existing tax law and the ACA exclude health care insurance or make
its cost deductible."l 0 The income that pays for uninsured health care
outlays (e.g., coinsurance, deductibles) is effectively taxed unless the
taxpayer has an HSA or a health expense FSA or the "basic" insurance
subsidized under the ACA for low to moderate income households.,'
Other provisions of the ACA eliminate copays and deductibles for some
individuals.' 12 Nevertheless, the ACA increases the tax burden on some
health care insurance coverage-obviously so in the case of coverage that
is much more generous than the ACA deems basic. 1 3 Perhaps this is part
of an implicit strategy for reducing moral hazard, or it may only be a
"consumption" correction, i.e., a tax-policy-based adjustment designed to
ensure that elective use of health care is properly classified as consumption
and, for that reason, included in the taxpayer's income.
Further exclusions for health care insurance and uninsured outlays
would be needed to preserve non-consumption status of health care. But
inclusions of some portion of "the value of low-cost large-employer-
provided health coverage would also be needed, precisely because the
market price of this coverage is much lower than the market price of so-
called "tailored" plans-which individuals must buy for themselves.
1 4
The ACA may change these market conditions, but it provides no direct
mechanism for doing so. Presumably, governmentally provided insurance
would not be taxed, so there would be no inherent problem of coordination
with respect to the coverage or benefits flowing to taxpayers from this
feature of the ACA.
2012, 2:15 PM), http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/20/many-americans-struggling-to-pay-
medical-bills/.
"0 See I.R.C. § 106(a) (excluding employer-provided coverage from gross income); id. § 213(a)
(allowing deduction for "medical expenses ... not compensated for by insurance or otherwise,... to
the extent that such expenses exceed 7.5% of adjusted gross income"); see also 26 U.S.C.A. § 49801
(West 2003 & Supp. 2011) (imposing excise tax on employer-sponsored health coverage).
.. 42 U.S.C.A. 18051.
"2E.g., id. § 13951.
"' See, e.g., 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 125, 213, 3101, 4001, 49801 (respectively, limiting the amount of
contributions to health flexible spending accounts to $2,500 per year; raising the level of expense
necessary for deduction under I.R.C. § 213 from 7.5% to 10% of adjusted gross income; imposing
additional hospital tax on high-income taxpayers; imposing annual fees on health insurance providers;
and imposing excise tax on employer-sponsored health coverage).
14 See Bradley W. Joondeph, Tax Policy and Health Care Reform: Rethinking the Tax Treatment
of Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance, 1995 BYU L. REV. 1229, 1249 (arguing that individually
underwritten insurance is extremely expensive, offers less comprehensive coverage, and must be
purchased with after-tax dollars, making it less favorable than employment sponsored insurance); see
also PAUL N. VAN DE WATER, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES, LIMITING THE TAX EXCLUSION
FOR EMPLOYER-SPONSORED INSURANCE CAN HELP PAY FOR HEALTH REFORM (June 4, 2009),
available at http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfin?fa=view&id=2832 (arguing that the tax exclusion of
employer-provided health insurance is poorly targeted and leads to an increase in health care spending).
[Vol. 44:1213
THE ACA AND TAX POLICY
From 1986 through the ACA's effective dates, nothing had been done
to integrate them comprehensively. Details of the ACA may provide a
better approximation of integrated policy, but such integration is still
biased in favor of the employed, and against retirees and the temporarily
unemployed."15 A single-payer system, even with co-pays, would make
the solution straightforward. Unfortunately, the political impossibility of
that alternative makes the complex task of revising tax policy not only
more difficult, but challenging at the most fundamental level. A
replacement for utility theory must be found if the government's
intervention to improve individuals' well-being is to achieve principled
fairness.
115 See Blaine G. Saito, Note, The Value of Health and Wealth: Economic Theory, Administration,
and Valuation Methods for Capping The Employer Sponsored Insurance Tax Exemption, 48 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 235, 245 (2011) (highlighting the vertical and horizontal equity problems created by the
exemption under the ACA for employment sponsored insurance).
2012]

